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‘‘Until the Sun of Science ...the true Apollo of
Medicine has risen’’: Collective Investigation in
Britain and America, 1880–1910
HARRY M MARKS
*
In August, 1880, George Murray Humphry, in his presidential address to the British
Medical Association (BMA), called for ‘‘collective action’’ by the country’s ‘‘eight thou-
sand physicians’’ to accumulate observations concerning the role of ‘‘temperamental,
climacteric, andtopographicalagencies upondisease’’. Through participating inorganized
inquiries, practitioners would ‘‘deepen their interest in the science of medicine, and impart
the charm of wider usefulness to the daily routine of life’’.
1 By December 1881, the BMA
had funded a Collective Investigation Committee, which over the next eight years would
sponsor nearly a dozen inquiries into the natural history of disease.
2 Beyond Great Britain,
Humphry’s appeal would launch an international movement for collective investigation,
with physicians in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States
following the British example.
3
At first glance, there is little exceptional about the movement for collective investiga-
tion.Organizedeffortstocollectpractitionerdataondiseasesandtheirtreatmentgobackat
least to the eighteenth-century: Fe ´lix Vicq d’Azyr led the Socie ´te ´ Royale de Me ´decine in
collecting data from French physicians on meteorological conditions and epidemics, while
in England John Jurin surveyed correspondents of the Royal Society concerning their
experiences with smallpox inoculation.
4 The London Medical-Chirurgical Society, the
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147Clinical Society of London, the BMA, the Massachusetts Medical Society and the
American Medical Association (AMA) each attempted analogous inquiries earlier in
the nineteenth century with disappointing results.
5 Yet the movement for collective inves-
tigation provides a unique window into late-nineteenth-century contests over medical
science and medical society.
The historians Christopher Lawrence, John Harley Warner and George Weisz have
analysed the intellectual and political tensions facing late-nineteenth-century e ´lite physi-
cians who sought to incorporate laboratory medicine into clinical practice. Contests over
what the laboratory could contribute to diagnosis or treatment were central to a decades-
long multinational debate about how future physicians should be trained and how current
physicians should practise.
6 Historians’ emphasis on this ‘‘great transformation’’ has
obscured a more immediate divide within the profession, between those practitioners
who saw clinical encounters as opportunities for discovery and learning, and the great
majority of working physicians who, their attentions focused on earning a living, had little
time for new knowledge. The movement for collective investigation, which sought to
harvest the experiences of general practitioners for medical science, demonstrates how
uninterested such practitioners were in the scientific and social aspirations articulated by
medical e ´lites.
The present article examines the history of collective investigation in Great Britain and
the United States, the two countries where the movement was most vigorous.
7 In Great
Britain, the sponsors of collective investigation were e ´lite consultants who insisted that the
experiences of general practitioners, properly gathered, could transcend the limitations of
hospital medicine. Their own background in hospital practice notwithstanding, these
consultants articulated a vision of a biographical medicine which might explain the tra-
jectories of disease in ways no study of morbid anatomy could achieve.
8 In the United
States, collective investigations focused more on therapeutics than on the natural history of
disease. Organized collective investigations were taken up by local medical societies,
5Minutes of Council, Medical and Chirurgical
Society of London, 30 Sept. 1831; 23 Oct. 1849;
11 Dec., 1849; 8 Jan. 1850, Royal Society of Medicine
archives, London. For the Clinical Society, see
Christian Baumler, Alfred B Duffin, Berkeley Hill,
‘Reportof the Committee on Temperature in Syphilis’,
Trans.Clin.Soc.London,1870,3:170–9.OntheBMA
committee, see ‘An investigation into the effects of
remedies’, Br. med. J., 1862, ii: 175–6; ‘Report of the
Committee on the Action of Medicines’, Br. med. J.,
1862, ii: 177; ‘The therapeutical inquiry’, Br. med. J.,
1862, ii: 284–5. For Massachusetts, see Ephraim
Cutter, Alonzo Chapin and S A Toothaker, ‘Report of
the Committee ...in the therapeutical action of
medicinal agents’, Boston med. Surg. J., 1863, 68:
342–7. For the AMA, see Worthington Hooker and
HDBuckley,‘ReportontheepidemicdiseasesofNew
EnglandandNewYork’,Trans.Am.med.Assoc.,1852,
5: 285–8.
6Christopher Lawrence, ‘Incommunicable
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Britain 1850–1914’, J. contemp. Hist., 1985, 20:
503–20; John Harley Warner, ‘Ideals of science and
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medicine’, Isis, 1991, 82: 454–78; idem, ‘The fall and
rise of professional mystery: epistemology, authority
and the emergence of laboratory medicine in
nineteenth-century America’, in Andrew Cunningham
and Perry Williams (eds), The laboratory revolution in
medicine, Cambridge University Press, 1992,
pp. 110–41; George Weisz, The emergence of modern
universities in France, 1863–1914, Princeton
University Press, 1983, pp. 359–68.
7It would, none the less, be useful to have an
analysis of the sociology and intellectual programme
for collective investigation in Germany, which was
initiated by the Berlin Medical Society. See
‘Collectiveinvestigationmovement’,Br.med.J.,1883,
ii: 20–1.
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UniversityPress,2000;seealsoDavidArmstrong,‘The
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Harry M Marksnational specialty groups and at least one drug company. Ephemeral as most such efforts
were, collective investigation none the less survived two decades longer in the United
StatesthaninGreatBritain.Inbothcountries,collectiveinvestigationultimatelyfailedasa
social movement for achieving professional cohesion and as a legitimate mode of inves-
tigation. The movement’s failures illuminate the fragility of e ´lite ideals about medical
knowledge and medical community in the late nineteenth century.
Collective Investigation in Britain, 1880–1889
Collective investigation was the brainchild of Frederick Horatio Akbar Mahomed
(1849–1884), ‘‘son of a Brighton Turkish-bath owner’’ who received his MD at Brussels
and worked on a Cambridge MB while serving as medical registrar at Guy’s Hospital.
While studying at Cambridge, he had been befriended by George Humphry, MB, FRS,
FRCS, then Professor of Anatomy.
9 Along with Humphry, Mahomed enlisted Arthur
Ransome, MB, a Manchester general practitioner and public health reformer who had
proposed a programme of organized medical inquiries to the BMA sixteen years earlier.
10
The programme for collective investigation, as the three men presented it, had two goals.
First, they hoped to transcend the limits of hospital ‘‘investigations’’ by enlisting general
practitioners to observe the facts of disease in its natural setting.
11 Second, the organizers
sought to involve ‘‘busy’’ practitioners in the scientific work of the profession, to bring
‘‘home to each man that he owed a duty to medicine as a science, which he was bound in
honour to render in return for the privilege of using her as a trade’’.
12
The latter objective held special appeal for those, like Humphry, who saw the BMA as
something more than a trade union. A university education was one means to draw
physicians away from the ‘‘engrossing avocations of [a] money-making life’’ but so
might the experience of participating in collective investigation.
13 ‘‘If the [BMA’s]
9On Mahomed’s career, see James F Goodhart and
W H A Jacobson, ‘In memoriam: Frederick Horatio
Akbar Mahomed’, Guy’s Hosp. Rept., 1886, 43: 1–10;
Samuel Wilks and George Thomas Bettany,
A biographical history of Guy’s Hospital, London,
Ward, Lock, Bowden, 1892, pp. 306–8. For Humphry,
see D’Arcy Power, ‘Sir George Murray Humphry
(1820–1896)’, Dictionary of National Biography, ed.
Sidney Lee, London, Smith, Elder, 1907, vol. 22
(Supplement), pp. 883–5; Sir Humphry Rolleston, ‘Sir
George Murray Humphry, MD, FRS,’ Ann. med. Hist.,
1927, 9: 1–11. Rolleston credits Alex Hill, Humphry’s
demonstrator, with the suggestion for collective
investigation, but I have found no corroborating
evidence for this claim.
10Arthur Ransome, ‘On the need of combined
medical observation’, Br. med. J., 1864, ii: 405–8;
F A Mahomed, ‘Suggestions concerning the scientific
work of the Association [letter]’, Br. med. J., 1880, i:
74. Ransome, with a degree in chemistry from the
University of Cambridge and clinical training in
London and Paris, was not your usual general
practitioner. Willis J Elwood, A Fe ´licite ´ Tuxford,
Some Manchester doctors: a biographical collection
to mark the 150th anniversary of the Manchester
Medical Society, Manchester University Press, 1984,
pp. 93–7.
11F A Mahomed, ‘Suggestions concerning the
scientificworkoftheAssociation,’Br.med.J.,1880,i:
31–2, p. 31; Ransome, op. cit., note 10 above. As the
officialorgan of the BMA,the British Medical Journal
kept much closer tabs on collective investigation than
the Lancet, especially when reporting on BMA branch
activities.
12Mahomed, op. cit., note 11 above. On ‘‘busy
men’’, see G M Humphry, ‘Remarks on the collective
investigation of disease’, Br. med. J., 1883, i: 145–6,
p. 146.
13Humphry, op. cit., note 1 above. For Humphry’s
views on the spiritual values of university medical
training, see an earlier address to the BMA:
GMHumphry,‘Addressonsurgery’,Br.med.J.,1864,
ii: 175–86, p. 177. See also William W Gull, ‘An
address on the collective investigation of disease’, Br.
med. J., 1883, i: 141–4, on p. 142; Samuel Wilks, ‘The
address in medicine’, Lancet, 1872, ii: 213–16.
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americamembers could combine for social and political purposes,’’ Humphry maintained, ‘‘they
ought certainly not to hesitate to do so for the promotion of the science and practice of
medicine.’’
14
The programme’s greatest appeal lay in its scientific promise that general practitioners
‘‘can trace the life-history of [a] disease in a manner which no one else can possibly do’’.
15
To whom did this promise speak? The patrons of collective investigation were a group of
prominentuniversityprofessorsande ´liteLondonclinicianswithalong-standinginterestin
‘‘constitutional’’ disease. Allied with Humphry (Cambridge University) were Henry
Acland (Oxford University), William Withey Gull and Samuel Wilks (both affiliated
with Guy’s Hospital), James Paget (St Bartholomew’s Hospital) and eight other prominent
consultant physicians, all but one London-based.
16 This clinical e ´lite believed deeply in
pathological anatomy as the bedrock of medicine: ‘‘Without morbid anatomy our work
would be foundationless and in the air.’’
17 But they had come to recognize its limits in
understanding clinical disease. As Gull put it:
One might as well hope to determine the physical geography of a country, by measuring and
analysing the contents of its rivers as they fall into the sea, as to hope to reach a true pathology from
studying alone the results of disease on the post mortem table.
18
Part of their dissatisfaction was with the excesses of contemporary solidist pathology,
especially its unproductive preoccupation with local disease. Even apparently loca-
lized diseases—of the kidneys, liver, heart, or lungs—were mere manifestations of
‘‘more general causes’’.
19 Unearthing such causes called for careful study of a patient’s
constitution.
20
14Prof. Humphry, ‘A short history of the
movement’, in The Collective Investigation Record,
GMHumphryandFAMahomed(eds),vol.1,London,
British Medical Association, 1883, pp. 1–6, on p. 2.
15Remarks of C Macnamara at a meeting of the
BMA’s Birmingham and Midlands branch, in
‘Collective investigation of disease’, Br. med. J.,
1883, i: 32–4, on p. 33.
16For Acland’s role, see Humphry, op. cit., note 14
above, p. 5. As President of the General Medical
Council, Acland’s support was welcome. Others active
in the committee included Walter Cheadle (St Mary’s
Hospital), Dyce Duckworth (St Bartholomew’s
Hospital), Octavius Sturges (Hospital for Sick
Children), Balthazar Foster (Birmingham), Stephen
Mackenzie (London Hospital), I Burney Yeo (King’s
College Hospital), Sidney Coupland (Middlesex
Hospital) and Isambard Owen (St George’s Hospital
Medical School), who replaced Mahomed as secretary
after the latter’s death. For a full list of members and
local committees, see ‘Organization for the Collective
Investigation of Disease’, The Collective Organization
Record, vol. 1, op. cit., note 14 above, pp. 160–8.
17Gull, op., cit., note 13 above, p. 141; Samuel
Wilks, A memoir, London, Adlard & Son, 1911,
pp. 124–9. Of the group, Wilks was the most strongly
committed to morbid anatomy. On the rise of
pathological anatomy in the previous generation, see
Russell C Maulitz, Morbid appearances: the anatomy
of pathology in the early nineteenth century,
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
18Gull, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 141; T Clifford
Allbutt, ‘Introductory address delivered at the Leeds
School of Medicine’, Lancet, 1871, ii: 531–5.
19Englishdiscussionsform partof a broader,trans-
European exploration of the relation between local and
humoral factors in disease. A history of national
pathological traditions, much needed, is beyond the
scope of this article. See, however, Pedro Laı ´n
Entralgo,Lahistoriaclı´nica:historiayteorı´adelrelato
patogra ´fico, facsimile edition, Madrid, Triacastela,
1998; Russell C Maulitz, ‘Rudolf Virchow, Julius
Cohnheim and the program of pathology’, Bull. Hist.
Med., 1978, 52: 162–82.
20Samuel Wilks, ‘Some remarks on the nature and
causes of disease’, Guy’s Hosp. Rept., 1859, 3rd series
14: 15–53, p. 17. Wilks put the blame for localist
dogmas not on morbid anatomy but on organ-based
specialists motivated by ‘‘mercantile’’ rather than
scientificinterests.SeealsoJamesPaget,‘Notesforthe
study of some constitutional diseases’, in Clinical
lectures and essays, New York, D Appleton, 1875,
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Harry M MarksThe ‘‘constitution’’of Paget, Gull and Wilks was notthat ofearliergenerations, invested
in identifying ‘‘phthisical’’ or ‘‘gouty’’ bodily types:
There are few worse habits in practice than that of commonly saying of one case ‘‘It is all gout’’,
and of another that it is all scrofula, or all syphilis. We might as well say of any Englishman that
he is all Norman, or all Anglo-Saxon or all Celt.
21
Rather, they were preoccupied with identifying the interactions between such bodily
predispositions and ‘‘accidents’’, which might be a habit of body (diet, exercise) or an
‘‘external condition’’ such as an infection or rash. Such accidents made all the difference
between a healthy person and a sick one, both with similar predispositions.
22 Yet the
antecedents of disease were frequently invisible to consultant practitioners. Understanding
this interplay required ‘‘a much more complete and exact study of all the personal con-
ditions of disease than is now usual’’—a patient’s family history but also his or her social
and medical biography.
23 Such natural histories were best studied not by consultants in
hospital or even in private practice, but by the general practitioner:
It is his privilege to see the earliest beginnings of disease, and to have the opportunity of tracing its
evolution and decline, or when so favourable a course does not happen, the steps of pathological
progress are before him, whereas at the end of life when the whole organism crushes downwards
into a chaos of pathological forms [so that] it is often impossible on the postmortem table to say
where the failure began and how it has advanced. The family physician’s observations should thus
supply a corrective to a too exclusive mechanical pathology.
24
For James Paget, the model was Charles Darwin: the patient and careful observer with
‘‘personal and exact knowledge’’ of family history could chart the ebb and flow of diseases
pp. 353–97; Humphry’s discussion of pyaemia in
Humphry,‘Addressonsurgery’,op.cit.,note13above,
pp. 179–80. For overviews of nineteenth-century
constitutionaldoctrines,seeCharlesERosenberg,‘The
bitter fruit: heredity, disease and social thought’, in
idem, No other gods: on science and American social
thought, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1976,pp. 25–53;ErwinHAckerknecht,‘Diathesis:the
word and the concept in medical history’, Bull. Hist.
Med.,1982,56:317–23;JohnCWaller,‘‘‘Theillusion
of an explanation’’: the concept of hereditary disease,
1770–1870,’ J. Hist. Med. Allied Sci., 2002, 57:
410–48.
21Observingthevariationamongtypeswasdeemed
more important than noting the types themselves.
James Paget, ‘Some rare and new diseases [1882]’, in
Selected essays and addresses, ed. Stephen Paget,
London,Longmans,Green,1902,pp.352–80,quoteon
p. 372. On the anti-determinism of constitutionalist
thinking, see Rosenberg, op. cit., note 20 above.
22See Paget’s analysis of a nearly fatal septicaemia
he developed after conducting an autopsy when he was
‘‘overtired’’ and his body no longer accustomed to the
‘‘poisons’’encounteredduringdissection.JamesPaget,
‘Notes for a clinical lecture on dissection poisons’,
Lancet,1871,i:735–6,774–6;idem,‘Ondiseaseofthe
mammary areola preceding cancer of the mammary
gland [1874]’, in Selected essays, op. cit., note 21
above, pp. 145–8. Compare Andrew Mendelsohn, who
argues that such an interest in the dynamic role of
external factors is a product of the fully realized germ
theory. J Andrew Mendelsohn, ‘Medicine and the
making of bodily inequality in twentieth-century
Europe’,inJean-PaulGaudilli  e ereandIlanaLo ¨wy(eds),
Heredity and infection: the history of disease
transmission, London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 21–80.
23Paget, op. cit., note 21 above, p. 372. See also
Wilks, op. cit., note 20 above, p. 50.
24William Gull, ‘An address on the international
collective investigation of disease’, Br. med. J., 1884,
ii:305–8,p.306.SeealsoSirWilliamGull,‘Addresson
clinical medicine’, Lancet, 1872, i: 139–40; idem,
‘Presidential address delivered before the Clinical
Society of London’, Lancet, 1871, i: 145–7; James
PagettoGeorgePaget,8March1880,inStephenPaget
(ed.), Memoirs and letters of Sir James Paget, London,
Longmans, Green, 1901, p. 293; Samuel Wilks, ‘An
addressoncollectiveinvestigationofdisease’,Br.med.
J.,1883,ii:1005;CJPWilliams,‘Onthesuccessesand
failures of medicine’, Lancet, 1862, i: 345–7; J Magee
Finny, ‘Collective investigation of disease’, Dublin
J. med. Sci., 1883, 75: 465–76, pp. 467–72.
151
Collective Investigation in Britain and Americaover generations. Such knowledge could elucidate both the inheritance of specific diseases
and the factors ‘‘which from generation to generation shall gradually obliterate the disease
which one ancestor may have acquired’’.
25 A deeper understanding of constitutions would
lead to a truer pathology and a more precise therapeutics:
We need not only the diagnosis between diseases essentially different, but that between the
different and varying forms of each of those [diseases] which we call by a generic name....Better
treatment will follow better diagnosis, and better diagnosis will certainly follow a more exact
pathology.
26
Underlying Paget’s view that ‘‘better treatment’’ would follow ‘‘a more exact pathology’’
was a scepticism about contemporary therapeutic practice that was widely shared in the
Londonconsultantmilieu,asuspicionthatdoctorsignorantofnaturalhistorywereinclined
to credit drugs for ‘‘what may be merely the decline of the disease itself’’.
27
Authorized by the BMA in 1881, the Collective Investigation Committee (CIC) pro-
posed a variety of inquiries, ranging from the natural history of specific diseases, to ‘‘life
histories’’ ofpatientsand their families, tostudies of specific remedies, a special interest of
Arthur Ransome’s.
28 Investigative work would be publicized through the BMA branches,
which might also propose specific inquiries. The CIC would select the studies, collect and
analyse the data, and then summarize the results. Most important were the data collection
forms, ‘‘convenient cards which can be carried in the pocket and filled up in a spare minute
of any time or place’’ in the busy practitioner’s life. ‘‘It has been accepted as a principle’’,
wrote the CIC secretary F A Mahomed, ‘‘that no written answers to questions beyond a
single stroke of the pen ...or occasionally a few words, must be asked for’’.
29
The CIC’s first inquiry, on phthisis, revealed problems with this approach. Prompted by
Robert Koch’s reports on the tubercle bacillus, the CIC asked simply, ‘‘Have you observed
any cases in which pulmonary phthisis appeared to be communicated from one person to
another?’’ Of 1078 physicians responding, 673 replied tersely, ‘‘No’’. The remaining 405
provided the asked-for data on cases they had observed, mostly in the form of brief clinical
25James Paget, ‘An address on the collective
investigation of disease’, in The Collective
Investigation Record, vol. 1, op. cit., note 14 above,
pp. 21–5, on p. 23. See idem, ‘Some rare and new
diseases’, and ‘Elemental pathology’, both in Selected
essays, op. cit., note 21 above, pp. 240–80. Paget
belonged to Darwin’s far-flung network of
correspondents on natural history but his interests in
natural history long proceeded their relationship. See
Janet Browne, Charles Darwin, vol. 2: The power of
place, New York, Alfred A Knopf, 2002, pp. 203, 286,
359;Paget,Memoirsandletters,op.cit.,note24above,
pp.25–28,32–38.SeealsoGull,op.cit.,note13above.
26Paget, op. cit., note 21 above, pp. 369–72, on
p. 369. See also Gull, ‘Address on clinical medicine
[continued]’, Lancet, 1872, i: 175–7; Wilks, op. cit.,
note 24 above; idem, ‘The address in medicine’,
Br. med. J., 1872, ii: 146–53.
27W B Cheadle, ‘The progress of medicine’,
Fortnightly Rev., 1867, 6: 567–78, p. 576. See also
James Paget, ‘Address by the President,’ Trans. Clin.
Soc.London,1870,3:xxxi–xxxix;WilliamWGulland
Henry G Sutton, ‘Remarks on the natural history of
rheumatic fever’, Medico-Chirurgical Trans., 1869,
8: 43–82, pp. 75–82; Samuel Wilks, ‘On the syphilitic
affections of the internal organs,’ Guy’s Hosp. Repts,
1863, 3rd series 9:1–63, pp. 14–16.
28Humphry, op. cit., note 14 above, p. 3.
Ransome’s interests may also be reflected in
proposals for topographical and epidemiological
inquiries. See Ransome, op. cit., note 10 above. In
general, the topics selected reflect the interests of
the London consultants in the natural history of
disease, not Ransome’s interests in therapeutics
and epidemiology.
29‘The work of the Collective Investigation
Committee’, Br. med. J., 1882, i: 355–6, p. 355;
‘Collective Investigation Committee: the function
of the local committees’, Br. med. J., 1882, i:
674–6.
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Harry M Marksanecdotes.
30 Subsequent inquiries on pneumonia (350 replies), acute rheumatism
(339 replies), chorea (200 replies) and diphtheria (138 replies) generated more detailed
information but in lesser amounts.
31 Stephen Mackenzie, author of the CIC report on
chorea, acknowledged that the inquiry on the natural history of chorea ‘‘may to some
appear disappointing’’. Detailed tables on clinical antecedents of chorea, and on the age,
sex, and social class of patients were admittedly ‘‘inconclusive’’, resolving none of the
existing debates on a subject of ‘‘considerable complexity and difficulty’’. None the less,
Mackenzie asserted weakly, the report demonstrated the willingness of ‘‘a large number of
members of our profession’’ to participate in ‘‘the scientific investigation of disease’’.
32
A CIC report on pneumonia was similarly equivocal about its findings.
33
Enthusiasm for collective investigation, high at first, quickly diminished. By 1885,
results from numerous inquiries had slowed to a trickle.
34 Practitioners complained
about the amounts of detailed information demanded: ‘‘It has been said that no one attends
a case of acute gout more than once a day, and that, therefore, no two temperatures can be
secured intwenty-fourhours.’’
35Practitionerscomplainedthattheywere‘‘toobusy’’inthe
day and‘‘too tired’’atnightto sparetime to writeup their observations.
36 ThomasDolan, a
Yorkshire physician, sarcastically asked whether, if the results were truly so valuable,
practitioners should not be paid for collecting them.
37 Even supporters of collective
investigation wondered whether ‘‘the Committee may have too much lost sight of the
conditions under which the practitioner works’’.
38 The CIC considered various expedients,
including (briefly) a greater reliance on hospital physicians for data.
39
Mounting expenditures combined with diminishing returns led to internal BMA inqui-
ries: were CIC members authorized to spend BMA funds to promote collective investiga-
tion at the International Medical Congress?
40 Opposition was furthered by groups within
30Sub-committee on phthisis (Dyce Duckworth,
Frederick Taylor, W J Tyson, I Burney Yeo,
F A Mahomed), ‘A report on the communicability
of phthisis’, in The Collective Investigation Record,
vol. 1, op. cit., note 14 above, pp. 26–92.
31These reports, all deemed ‘‘preliminary’’, were
published in The Collective Investigation Record,
vol. 1, op. cit., note 14 above, pp. 93–133.
32Stephen Mackenzie, ‘Report on chorea returns’,
The Collective Investigation Record, London, British
Medical Association, 1887, vol. 3, pp. 45–56, on p. 45.
33‘Report on pneumonia’, The Collective
Investigation Record, London, British Medical
Association, 1884, vol. 2, pp. 5–71.
34British Medical Association archives, London
(hereafter BMA). Minutes of the Collective
Investigation Committee, 14 Jan. 1885, B/74/1/1. All
further BMA archival references are to this collection
unless otherwise noted.
35For gout, see Dyce Duckworth, ‘An address on
collective investigation of disease’, Br. med. J., 1884,
i: 4–5, p. 4. See also the remarks of Dr Saunby
(secretary of the local committee) and Dr Rickards
at the Birmingham and Midland Counties Branch,
‘Collective investigation of disease’, Br. med. J., 1883,
i: 33; remarks of Mr Vincent Jackson, ‘Staffordshire
Branch’, Br. med. J., 1885, i: 743; Report of the
Collective Investigation Committee, 1 July, 1885,
BMA. For a sample of an early and unusually detailed
form, see Shirley F Murphy, ‘Memorandum on
diphtheria’, Br. med. J., 1882, ii: 1173–75,
pp. 1174–75.
36Wilks, op. cit., note 24 above, p. 1005.
37T M Dolan, ‘Collective Investigation
Committee’, Br. med. J., 1881, ii: 101.
38Sidney Coupland, ‘Address on collective
investigation’, Br. med. J., 1884, i: 1197–99, p. 1198.
39Minutes, CIC committee, 14 Jan. 1885; Minutes,
General Committee, CIC, 14 Oct. 1885, BMA.
40Initsfirstyearofoperation(1882),theCICspent
£474 8s 9d, a substantial sum in an organization
recently returned to financial health. See Report of
the CIC to the Annual Meeting, 3 July 1883, BMA.
In 1884, they sought £600 for their second year of
operations. See G M Humphry, ‘Report of the
Collective Investigation Committee’, The Collective
Investigation Record, vol. 2, op. cit., note 33 above,
pp. 1–4, on p. 1. On the BMA’s finances, see Peter
Bartrip, Themselves writ large: the British Medical
Association 1832–1966, London, BMJ Publishing
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americathe BMA who apparently resented the CIC’s autonomy and prosperity. The Section on
Therapeutics wished for a greater role in therapeutic inquiries; various BMA branches
questioned the CIC’s ‘‘premature’’ publication of reports and the allegedly centralized
conduct of the inquiries.
41 The CIC’s short-term political difficulties were none the less
surmountable, once new budgetary controls were imposed and compromises with the
Section on Therapeutics negotiated.
42
The decisivechallengecamefrom thosewhoquestioned the basic premisesof collective
investigation. ‘‘Among the thousands of practitioners who took part in the work,’’
George W Potter averred, ‘‘only a small proportion were competent, by natural capability
and education, to conduct scientific inquiries.’’
43 Such inquiries were little more than
‘‘scientific book-keeping’’, added Thomas Dolan: ‘‘If book-keeping were all that was
required, we should have long since arrived at a knowledge of diphtheria’’. Collective
investigation inevitably lacked the insight provided by the ‘‘personal equation of the
discoverer’’, a discriminating observer, Dolan implied, like himself.
44
Collective investigation’s critics insisted that true medical knowledge, like tact and
manners, was an interpretive skill demanding discernment and character. As Christopher
Lawrence has argued, such ‘‘incommunicable knowledge’’ was seen as the product of a
lengthy moral apprenticeship, accessible to the few and not the many.
45 Collective inves-
tigation, by contrast, was aimed at the gathering of facts which ‘‘are of value only from
their number, and not from the importance of individual observations’’.
46 Enthusiasts
insisted that harvesting ‘‘the common everyday facts’’ of general medical practice was
‘‘as valuable and important work as any that can be done just now for medicine’’.
47 It did
not help that some CIC facts, such as degrees of ‘‘abstinence’’ from drink, were poorly
defined.
48 But as CIC reports reluctantly acknowledged, even well-gathered facts cannot
Group, 1996,pp. 54–6.On the Berlin expenditures, see
Minutes, Committee of Direction (CIC), 8 Apr. 1885,
14 Oct. 1885; Minutes, BMA Council, 8 July 1885,
B/55/2/2, Minutes of Council and Subcommittees,
1855–1887, BMA.
41For branch criticisms, see Minutes, Collective
Investigation Committee, 18 Jan. 1885; Minutes,
Committee of Direction, 21 July 1886, BMA. For
additionalcriticisms,see‘Thepreliminaryreportofthe
CollectiveInvestigationCommitteeonDiphtheria’,Br.
med. J., 1884, i: 1111–13. On the complaints of the
Section on Therapeutics, see Committee of Direction
(CIC), Minutes, 1 July 1885; Joint Meeting of CIC
members and President of BMA plus President and
officers of sections, Cardiff, 29 July 1885;
‘Investigation of the action of medicines’, Br. med J.,
1885, ii: 313. Balthazar Foster, initially a proponent of
collectiveinvestigation,playeda keyroleinpromoting
the interests of the Section on Therapeutics within the
BMA.
42On funding, see Minutes, Committee of
Direction,14April1886.RelationswiththeSectionon
Therapeutics continued to be conflictual, despite a
formal agreement. See Joint Meeting of CIC members
and President of BMA plus President and officers of
sections, Cardiff, 29 July 1885; Minutes, CIC General
Committee, 14 Apr. 1886, 21 July 1886.
43G W Potter [presentation on the dangers of
collective investigation], ‘Metropolitan Counties
Branch:NorthernDistrict’,Br.med.J.,1884,i:386;see
also the criticisms reported in Committee of Direction,
Minutes, 19 Jan. 1887, BMA; Octavius Sturges, ‘The
Collective Investigation Committee’s report on acute
pneumonia’, Br. med. J., 1885, i: 348–49, p. 348.
44Thomas M Dolan, ‘Collective investigation’,
Br. med. J. 1884, i: 1249–50, p. 1249.
45Lawrence, op. cit., note 6 above.
46‘The Collective Investigation Movement’,
Br. med. J., 1883, ii: 20.
47‘Collective investigation’, Br. med. J., 1883,
i: 22; see also ‘Collective investigation of disease
[Birmingham and Midlands Branch]’, Br. med. J.,
1883, i: 32.
48‘Report on pneumonia’, op. cit., note 33 above,
p. 32; Isambard Owen, ‘Report on the inquiry into the
connection of disease with habits of intemperance’, in
The Collective Investigation Record, London, British
Medical Association, 1888, vol. 4, pp. 100–111.
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Harry M Marksspeak for themselves. Facts, like opinions, were diverse and contradictory. As the authors
of the CIC’s report on pneumonia diffidently put it:
The large body of facts here brought together point to certain conclusions which, while they cannot
be said in any case to reach the level of demonstration, are based upon different degrees of evidence
whose precise value will be variously estimated according to the prepossessions of individual
readers.
49
What, then, had collective investigation achieved?
Collective investigation, committee members conceded, had ‘‘not realized the sanguine
expectations of some of its promoters’’. None the less, it would be ‘‘an error to regard its
career in the past five years as a failure’’.
50 Collective investigation, proponents claimed,
had done something far more valuable than produce definitive ‘‘positive’’ knowledge. In
several cases, inquiries shed doubt on well-accepted beliefs in the profession.
51 More
importantly, the careful note-taking required by collective investigation honed partici-
pants’ observational skills, a result outlasting the reports themselves.
52 In teaching general
practitioners how to observe, collective investigation had created a ‘‘small ‘army of
observation’ within the profession’’.
53 Such methodical note-taking and observation
was highly valued within the consultant milieu.
54 In the eyes of most BMA members,
however, ‘‘collective’’ as opposed to ‘‘individual’’ investigation, was moribund. By
January 1887, the BMA began winding down its support for collective investigation.
55
The last report, on medical histories of the aged, was distributed at Humphry’s personal
expense in 1889.
56 The BMA had better uses for its money, including subsidies for a newly
created committee on therapeutics.
57
Collective investigation did not lack for external enemies: jealous provincial practi-
tioners like Thomas Dolan, consultants like Birmingham’s Balthazar Foster advancing
the interests of the Section on Therapeutics, or BMA members who were simply looking
for more practical guidance on treatment. Their criticisms were fuelled by pre-
existing tensions betweenBMA branchesand the London consultant milieu. Yet collective
49‘Report on pneumonia’, op. cit., note 33
above, p. 64. See also the anonymous criticism in
‘Preliminary report of the Collective Investigation
Committee on Diphtheria’, The Collective
Investigation Record, vol. 1, op. cit., note 14
above, pp. 28–33.
50Memorandum on collective investigation, Dec.
1886. BMA.
51G M Humphry, ‘Report on aged persons’, The
CollectiveInvestigationRecord,vol.4,op.cit.,note48
above,pp.85–99,onp.90;Memorandumoncollective
investigation, Dec. 1886, BMA.
52‘Collective investigation’, Br. med. J., 1885,
i:196–7;Finny,‘Collectiveinvestigation’,op.cit.,note
24 above, p. 472; Coupland, op. cit., note 38 above,
p. 1198; Philip H Kidd, ‘The late Mr Charles
Palmer and collective investigation’, Br. med. J.,
1885, i: 208. Kidd was none the less critical of
collective investigation for not insisting that
practitioners record their notes while observing
the patient.
53Memorandum on collective investigation, Dec.
1886, BMA.
54Sir James Paget, Studies of old case-books,
London, Longmans, Green, 1891, pp. v–viii;
Duckworth, op. cit., note 35 above; A[rchibald]
E G[arrod], ‘Sir Dyce Duckworth, Bart., M.D.,
1840–1928’, St. Barthholomew’s Hosp. Repts, 1929,
62: 18–41, p. 27.
55FrancisFowkestoIsambardOwen,19Jan.1887;
Quarterly report of the Standing Subcommittee,
Jan.–March 1887, BMA.
56George MurrayHumphry,Old age: the results of
information received respecting nearly nine hundred
persons who had attained the age of eighty years,
including seventy-four centenarians, Cambridge,
Macmillan and Bowes, 1889. On distribution, see ‘The
British Medical Association and collective
investigation’, Br. med. J., 1928, ii (Supplement):
245–8, p. 248.
57Minutes, BMA Council, 18 July 1888, 12 July
1888, b/54/2/4, BMA.
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americainvestigation’sinjurieswereultimatelyself-inflicted.Humphryandhisassociateshadtried
to enlist general practitioners in an intellectual project born of their own experience as
consultant physicians. Raised in the hospital milieu of morbid anatomy, they had encoun-
tered the limits of anatomical pathology for explaining and managing clinical disease.
Believing that the key to pathology (and therapy) lay in tracing the manifestations of
disease across the generations, they had envisioned a series of ‘‘life-history’’ albums
through which general practitioners could record the natural history of diseases in indi-
viduals and their families.
58 This most ambitious of collective investigations was stillborn:
general practitioners had neither the opportunity nor, in most cases, the interest to sustain
such a project.
General practitioners in late-nineteenth-century Britain faced a harsh marketplace in
which professional and economic difficulties loomed large. Local colleagues were easily
regarded as competitors, not as potential collaborators.
59 Even the more idealistic practi-
tioners were not in a position to wait for that ‘‘truer’’ pathology which would direct them
towards a sounder therapeutics. The more cynical among them may have seen collective
investigation as little more than a device for publicizing the names and reputations of their
competitors, as did Dolan:
It is a great advantage to those practitioners whose names have been printed on the Collective
Investigation cards. They have been thus brought before the profession in a special manner
connected with a special disease, so that an inference might be drawn that they were authorities on
this disease—an inference not always correct.
60
For consultants and general practitioners alike, the day when the ‘‘sun of science, which is
the true Apollo of Medicine’’ would rise remained as remote as ever.
61 In Britain, the
decade of collective investigation was over.
In Search of Therapeutic Authority:
Collective Investigation in the United States
The story of collective investigation in the United States is more episodic. At various
times, ‘‘collective investigation’’ was taken up by state and local medical societies, by the
58F A Mahomed, ‘On medical life-histories’, Br.
med. J., 1882, ii: 1295–96; Minutes, Collective
InvestigationCommittee,20March1882,1Aug.1883,
16 Oct. 1883, BMA; Minutes, Collective investigation
ofdisease,SubcommitteeMinutebook,13Oct.1885,b/
764/2/1, BMA; Karl Pearson, Life, letters and labours
of FrancisGalton, 3vols, CambridgeUniversityPress,
1924, vol. 2, pp. 360–7; Charles Roberts, ‘The life-
history album [letter]’, Br. med. J., 1884, ii: 1166.
59Anne Digby, Making a medical living: doctors
and patients in the English market for medicine, 1720–
1911, Cambridge University Press, 1994. Digby
suggeststhateconomicpressureswereincreasinginthe
1880s,seeibid.,pp.136–48.Onjealousyandsuspicion
among practitioners, see Alfred Cox, Among the
doctors, London, Christopher Johnson, [1950],
pp. 54–6. I am grateful to Dr Andrew Morrice for
calling this source to my attention.
60Dolan, op. cit., note 44 above, p. 1249.
61The phrase is William Gull’s, announcing early
plans forcollective investigation. Gull, op. cit., note13
above, p. 141. Chris Lawrence suggests that
resemblances between James Mackenzie’s work at
Aberdeen and collective investigation deserve further
exploration (personnal communication); see Jane
Macnaughton, ‘The St Andrews Institute for clinical
research: an early experiment in collaboration’, Med.
Hist., 2002, 46: 549–68. In the 1920s, the BMA used
the term ‘‘collective investigations’’ to describe its
surveysofhospitalconsultants’resultsinusingsurgery
to treat ulcers. Other than the name, these surveys
have little in common with the purposes and
methods of collective investigation. See Arthur P Luff,
‘Report on collective investigation into the after-
history of gastro-enterostomy’, Br. med. J., 1929,
ii: 1074–78, 1125–29; Br. med. J., 1930, i: 348–54.
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Harry M MarksAmerican Pediatric Society, by individual practitioners, and by the Parke, Davis drug
company. Between 1883 and 1910, any survey of physicians might be deemed a
‘‘collective investigation’’. The term, along with the British example, was even invoked
by a representative of the Michigan State Board of Health, in an effort to promote sickness
reporting by physicians.
62
The multiple invocations of collective investigation reflect the heterogeneous character
of American medicine itself. Collective investigation was introduced to a medical profes-
sion still fractured along multiple lines: by training, by region and by generation. The
American Medical Association was strongest in the north-east where members of a puta-
tive medical e ´lite still expressed open contempt for the training and ability of physicians in
the south and mid-west.
63 Within the north-east, younger laboratory-oriented physicians
and an older generation of clinicians were similarly divided by interest and conviction.
64
Against this background of heterogeneity, collective investigation appealed to both local
and national medical leaders looking to unify the profession. But such appeals meant little
to most working practitioners, and the resulting hopes for collective investigation would
frequently be disappointed.
As in Britain, collective investigation in the United States had precedents in medical
society inquiries on therapeutics and in US Army studies of climatology and epidemic
disease.
65 The immediate impetus came from an 1883 BMA invitation for the American
Medical Association to organize a series of collective investigations. ‘‘In a country em-
bracing so great an extent of territory as ours’’, AMA representatives opined, state medical
societies were ‘‘more likely to secure results of value, both in regard to quantity and
quality’’ than any national committee.
66
For professional leaders, scientific uplift of the profession at large was seen as a major
benefit of the enterprise. In the more pluralist, less stratified medical profession of North
America, the observations of all were invited:
Disease is many-sided; and we wish to include in our organization those who see it from every side.
All, therefore, whether hospital physicians, family and school attendants, specialists, medical
officers of the Army and Navy, and of workhouses and asylums, will be asked to contribute their
quota of observation to the common fund.
67
The AMA’s call met with a prompt, enthusiastic response from local medical leaders
around the country but little interest from the profession’s rank and file. In 1884, the
Medical SocietyoftheStateofPennsylvaniabegan organizingacollectiveinvestigationof
62Henry B Baker, ‘Scientific collective
investigation of disease’, J. Am. med. Assoc., 1887,
9: 486–90.
63John Shaw Billings, ‘Medicine in the United
States, and its relations to co-operative investigation’,
Br. med. J., 1886, ii: 299–307, esp. pp. 300–4; William
G Rothstein, American physicians in the nineteenth
century: from sects to science, Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1972, pp. 201–7.
64Warner,‘Idealsofscience’,op.cit.,note6above;
Toby A Appel, ‘Biological and medical societies and
thefoundingoftheAmericanPhysiologicalSociety’,in
Gerald L Geison (ed.), Physiology in the American
context, 1850–1940, Bethesda, American
Physiological Society, 1987, pp. 158–62.
65Seethesourcescitedinnote5above,andJamesH
Cassedy, Medicine and American growth, 1800–1860,
Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1986,
pp. 44–8.
66‘Collective investigation of diseases’, J. Am.
med. Assoc., 1883, 1: 216–18, p. 218. See also
Davis, op. cit., note 3 above.
67‘International collective investigation’, J. Am.
med. Assoc., 1884, 3: 442–3, p. 442. On uplift, see also
‘Collective investigation of diseases’, op. cit., note 66
above.
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americapneumonia, modelled on the British inquiry. Of the 2000 cards distributed, only sixty were
returned in the first year. These ‘‘very meagre’’ results were barely improved on with the
ninety-one results from the rheumatism inquiry reported in 1886. After limping along for
two additional years, the committee asked to be ‘‘discharged’’.
68 In metropolitan New
York, the county medical society sent out 800 cards for an investigation of fibrous
pneumonia: ‘‘only forty-six practitioners and four hospitals’’ took an ‘‘active part’’ in
producing the eighty-seven case reports.
69 Ohio’s committee, in existence from 1883 to
1887,apparentlyproducednoresultsworthreporting.
70Illinoisreportedthatthenumberof
results was ‘‘so small that a tabulation ...would possess no practical value’’.
71 Missouri’s
epidemiological investigation of malarial fever yielded replies from thirty-seven of the
state’s 115 counties.
72
Most local medical societies gave up collective investigation after a few years’ frustra-
tion. In Connecticut, the state medical society persisted into the new century, reporting
inquiries on new drugs (1885, 1889), albuminuria (1888), syphilis (1890), appendicitis
(1894), diphtheria antitoxin (1895), treatment for typhoid (1897), malaria in children
(1898), rheumatism (1902) and pulmonary tuberculosis (1903). Yet the returns in
Connecticut were no stronger than elsewhere, between seventy to ninety of the state’s
600-plus physicians.
73 As the committee asking about typhoid therapies complained of its
seventy-one replies:
With such a theme as this before them it was hoped that the interest of every practitioner would be
enlisted, especially that men who had seen most of the disease ...would contribute to the solution
of the unsettled questions. But it has not been so. From Stamford where there has been within two
years an epidemic of four hundred and six cases only one response was received; very many of our
leading practitioners in both city and county have kept their knowledge to themselves. This is not
what the Connecticut Medical Society was organized for; this is not the normal attitude of the
profession. It required only a little thought and time on the part of each one to make a strong
showing that would be creditable. Something cannot come from nothing in medical investigations
any more than in agriculture or commerce.
74
A poor yield aside, the information reported in collective investigations did little to
bolster the confidence asserted ‘‘in the acumen and wisdom of the general
68James Tyson, Charles K Mills, R H Chase,
‘Report of the Committee on the Collective
InvestigationofDisease’,Trans.Med.Soc.StatePenn.,
1885, 17: 66–73; William A Edwards, ‘Report of
the Committee on the Collective Investigation of
Disease. Report on acute rheumatism’, Trans. Med.
Soc. State Penn., 1886, 18: 84–8. For the creation
of the committee, see ‘Minutes of the annual meeting’,
Trans. Med. Soc. State Penn., 1884, 16: 1–50, pp.
30–1; for dissolution, see ‘Minutes of the annual
meeting’, Trans. Med. Soc. State Penn., 1888, 20:
1–33, p. 19.
69FASeibert,‘Acollectiveinvestigationregarding
fibrous pneumonia,’ New York med. J., 1885, 41:
697–8.
70See Trans. Ohio State Med. Soc., vols 38–42.
71J F Todd, ‘Report of the Committee on Original
Investigation’, Trans. Illinois State med. Soc.,
1884, 324–5.
72B F Hart, ‘Report of Special Committee on
Collective Investigation of Disease,’ St. Louis Courier
Med.,1886,16:1–22.TheorganizationoftheMissouri
inquiry is unclear; it seems as if questionnaires were
sent to the county medical societies, who chose only
one physician to reply.
73See the various ‘Report[s] of the Committee on
Matters of Professional Interest in the State’, Proc.
Conn. med. Soc., 1883–1905.
74‘Report of the Committee on Matters of
Professional Interest in the State’, Proc. Conn. med.
Soc., 1897, 105: 97–119, p. 102. See similar
complaints for the syphilis and appendicitis
inquiries: ‘Report of the Committee on Matters of
Professional Interest in the State’, Proc. Conn. med.
Soc., 1890, 99: 251–69, pp. 251–3; ‘Report of
the Committee on Matters of Professional Interest in
the State’, Proc. Conn. med. Soc., 1894, 102: 91–111,
pp. 91–3.
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Harry M Markspractitioner’’.
75 Poor record keeping meant unanswered questions. Poorly reported data
compounded the problem: ‘‘It is impossible to tell how many cases the replies represent or
with what care the observations were made.’’
76 The greatest difficulty came from the
diversity of opinion among those surveyed. Convallaria majalis (lily of the valley) might
be ‘‘much more uniform’’ or ‘‘less certain’’ than digitalis, ‘‘more reliable than digitalis as a
tonic’’ or ‘‘not so reliable as digitalis’’, depending on which anonymous opinion one
believed.
77
After two decades of collective investigation in Connecticut, J E Loveland, a young
Middleton practitioner (Harvard Medical School, 1892) wondered about its value for
questions better studied in the ‘‘hospital ward’’. For some questions, collective investiga-
tion nonethe less haduniqueadvantages:‘‘wecanonlylearnfromthe physician himself, if
we can learn at all, how often he has been a carrier of the contagion of Scarlet Fever’’. For
his survey, Loveland sought out only ‘‘men who were forty years or over, who had large
general practices and who were accurate observers’’.
78 While the third-party reports
received were too sketchy to be of value, he found the few first-hand reports, most
from ‘‘intimate friends in the county’’, fully persuasive.
79 Information about the practices
Connecticut physicians used to prevent transmission was less informative. Loveland’s
greatest ‘‘surprise’’ was that 11 per cent of practitioners did not believe that they would
transmit scarlet fever via their clothes or persons. Apparently, one could and did learnfrom
collective investigation how poorly physicians kept up with current knowledge.
80
ForagroupofPhiladelphiaphysicians,fifty-fourcasesseemedsufficienttodemonstrate
‘‘the positive efficaciousness of sweet-oil [olive oil] in the treatment of gall-stone colic’’.
81
Their colleagues remained unconvinced. The committee was either mistaken—without
post-mortem data, how did they know pains were due to gallstones?—or deceived—any
lubricant might temporarily relieve a spasm but would do nothing to dissolve stones.
82
The most successful of all collective investigations was the American Pediatric
Society’s (APS) inquiry on diphtheria antitoxin. Introduced into the United States from
Europe in 1894–95, antitoxin’s value was challenged by physicians who questioned the
bacteriological case-definitions used in the initial evaluations. Sceptics asserted that such
cases were not ‘‘true’’ clinical diphtheria, and the favourable results reported for antitoxin
were not to be believed.
83 The paediatric specialists leading the APS had a different
75‘Report of the Committee on Matters of
Professional Interest in the State,’ Proc. Conn. med.
Soc., 1896, 106: 111–24, p. 111.
76‘Report of the Committee on Matters of
Professional Interest in the State’, Proc. Conn. med.
Soc., 1885, 94: 47–95, p. 60.
77Ibid., pp. 61–2. See also the inquiry on
antipyretics: ‘Report of the Committee on Matters of
Professional Interest in the State’, Proc. Conn. med.
Soc., 1889, 98: 73–82, pp. 78–9.
78J E Loveland, ‘The physician as a carrier of the
contagion of scarlet fever: a collective investigation’,
Proc. Conn. med. Soc., 1904, 112: 173–208, quotes
on p. 175.
79Ibid., pp. 183, 187–8.
80Ibid., p. 179. See also the discussion of a lack of
innovation in typhoid treatment: ‘Report of the
Committee on Matters of Professional Interest’, Proc.
Con. med. Soc., 1897, 105: 97–119.
81‘A collective investigation by the Therapeutic
SectionofthePhiladelphiaPolyclinicMedicalSociety.
Sweet-oil in the treatment of Gall-stones’, The Times
and Register, 1891, 260–7, p. 265. The committee’s
idea of collective investigation was capacious:
seventeen of the fifty-four cases were from citations to
the published literature.
82Ibid., pp. 265–7.
83Evelynn Maxine Hammonds, Childhood’s
deadly scourge: the campaign to control diphtheria in
New York City, 1880–1930, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1999, pp. 122–31. See also the
discussion of the case-mix issue in William H Welch,
‘The treatment of diphtheria by antitoxin’, Trans.
Assoc. Am. Phys., 1895, 10: 312–75.
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americaconcern. The earliest studies, done in municipal hospitals and on tenement populations,
tilted towards advanced cases, treated several days into the illness. Such studies were of
limited value to the community practitioner:
There are very few hospitals in America that receive diphtheria patients and the conditions under
which patients are admitted to hospitals and the surroundings while there are so different from those
of private practice, that the measure of success in hospital cases cannot be taken as an index of the
results which have been obtained upon this side of the Atlantic with the new treatment.
84
The APS surveyed 613 physicians in fifteen states across the nation, accumulating data
on 3,384 cases.
85 Analyses distinguished results by age, co-morbidity, severity of disease
anddateoftreatment,aswell asbywhetherornotthe diagnoses hadbeen bacteriologically
confirmed. The results were striking: antitoxin treatment lowered mortality to 13 per cent
and, for patients treated on the first day of illness, to an unprecedented 4.9 per cent.
86 The
Society’s recommendation that diphtheria antitoxin be used as early as possible was
‘‘published in virtually every medical journal’’ in the country, largely ending debates
about antitoxin’s value.
87
To some members, however, the APS’s recommendation on antitoxin ‘‘looks like
establishing scientific truths by legislation’’.
88 The occasion for this complaint was a
heated debate over a second APScollectiveinvestigation,on the causes of infantile scurvy.
The committee reported that in 275 of 379 cases, a faulty diet was involved, and that a
change from commercial foods to a more ‘‘natural’’ diet seemed to reverse the condition.
89
Though the committee was at pains to insist that it was simply summarizing the
experiences of others, some APS members saw the report as an attack on sterilized
84L Emmett Holt, W P Northrup, Joseph O’Dwyer
and Samuel S Adams, ‘The report of the American
Pediatric Society’s collective investigation into the use
of antitoxin in the treatment of diphtheria in private
practice’, Trans. Am. Ped. Soc., 1896, 8: 21–45,
p. 21. Both antitoxin’s proponents and critics could
point to the non-representative character of hospital
studies: John W Branna, ‘A critical analysis of Dr.
Winters’ clinical observations on the antitoxin
treatment of diphtheria’, Med. News, 1896, 48: 691–4;
John W Kyger, ‘A protest against accepting the
conclusions of hospital physicians as to the value of
antitoxine in diphtheria’, New York med. J., 1895,
62: 151.
85The study also reported cases from 942 cases
treated by the New York City Health Department and
1,468 cases treated by the Chicago Health Department.
Holt, et al., ‘Report’, op. cit., note 84 above.
86Ibid. The stratified analysis follows closely the
earlierdiscussionbyWilliamHenryWelchconcerning
factors which had confounded interpretation of the
hospital results. Welch, op. cit., note 83 above. It is
difficult to compare these results directly with
pre-antitoxin experience; in-hospital case-fatality rates
could run at 50 per cent or higher but there was limited
dataoncommunitypracticepriortotheAPSstudy.The
results were universally acclaimed as dramatic,
however.
87Barbara Gutmann Rosenkrantz, ‘Cart before
horse: theory, practice and professional image in
American public health, 1870–1920’, J. Hist. Med.
Allied Sci., 1974, 29: 55–73, p. 70. See also
Hammonds, op. cit., note 83, above, pp. 132–6. A
second favourable report, on cases involving partial or
total blockage of the larynx, was published the
following year. W P Northrup, Joseph O’Dwyer,
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Pediatric Society’s report on the collective
investigation of the antitoxin treatment of laryngeal
diphtheria in private practice, 1896–1897’, Trans.
Am. Pediatr. Soc., 1897, 9: 32–8.
88Comments of Dr [Walter Shield] Christopher,
in ‘The American Pediatric Society’s collective
investigation on infantile scurvy in north America’,
Arch. Pediatr., 1898, 15: 481–508, p. 500. Nathan
Davis made a similarlydisparaging analogyto politics,
describing collective investigations as like deciding
‘‘scientific questions by popular vote’’. See Davis,
op. cit., note 3 above, p. 44.
89Ibid. The committee took little note of the fact
that fruit juice was included in most (257) of the
successfully treated cases. On doctors and ‘‘artificial’’
feeding, see Rima D Apple, Mothers and medicine:
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Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1987,
pp. 23–34, 53–71.
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Harry M Marksmilk, which had been used in many cases to prepare the foods. Milk sterilization had been
heavily promotedbypaediatriciansas‘‘oneofthe greatest advance[s]inthe lasthalfofthis
century’’. Dr August Caille ´ pressed for a minority report which would exonerate steriliza-
tion ‘‘per se’’ from promoting scurvy.
90
The dispute over sterilization soon turned into a debate on the value of collective
investigation. As J P Griffith, the committee’s chair explained, they were reluctant to
draw conclusions based upon the reports of ‘‘observers we do not know.... We do not
know how many[reports] are accurate, of course, and so we only took the figures received,
added themupandgave you theresults’’.
91Thereport’slackofconclusionsbothered some
members, while its implied indictment of sterilized milk troubled others even more.
92
Further doubts about the nature and status of collective investigations soon emerged.
Supposing conclusions were desired, should the report incorporate the personal experience
and judgements of committee members or should the findings remain ‘‘not clouded by
individual opinions?’’
93 As Dr Edward M Buckingham, Instructor in the Diseases of
Children at the Harvard Medical School, observed:
When Dr. Caille ´ presented his minority report it seemed to me that what he did was to proffer the
evidence that has come from his personal knowledge and the knowledge of his personal friends
rather than the observations of people that he knows very little about. There are just two
conclusions that can be drawn: Either sterilization of milk produces scurvy or collective inves-
tigations are not a safe way of getting information.
94
The APS accepted the committee’s inconclusive report on infantile scurvy, but collective
investigation itself had proved untrustworthy.
95 A mistrust of data from ‘‘unknown’’
individuals, combined with anxieties that institutional authority might pre-empt individual
clinical judgement, ended collective investigations at the APS.
96 Paediatric meetings
returned to the norm: detailed clinical reports from seasoned clinical observers were
assessed by the private judgements of individual practitioners.
From the start, collective investigations in the United States had tilted towards practical
therapeutic questions. No surprise that collective investigation was taken up by a pro-
gressive drug firm, Parke, Davis & Company. The company published its results in a
house organ, the Therapeutic Gazette and in a series of working bulletins on specific
drugs.
97 With drugs sent to ‘‘a large number of practitioners scattered over the land’’, the
company did ‘‘not claim that the information gathered in this way is conclusive’’ but
90Remarks of Dr [August] Caille ´ in ‘Collective
investigation of infantile scurvy’, op. cit., note 88
above, p. 506; for Caille ´’s minority report, see ibid., p.
500. On the Committee’s demurrals, see ibid., pp. 485,
495, 507.
91Remarks of Dr Griffith, ibid., p. 507.
92Compare the comments of Drs [Walter Shield]
Christopher and [William Perry] Northrup, ibid.,
p. 500.
93RemarksofDrs[SamuelS]Adams,[JohnLovett]
Morse and [Abraham] Jacobi, ibid., pp. 504–5.
94Ibid., p. 502.
95Ibid., p. 508.
96The APS did publish editorial notices of
two subsequent collective investigations conducted
by other groups: ‘Collective investigation by the
Gesellschaft fu ¨r Kinderheilkunde of Barlow’s
Disease (Infantile Scurvy)’, Arch. Ped., 1904,
21: 212–14; ‘Collective investigation of
anterior poliomyelitis’, Arch. Ped., 1907,
24: 849–50.
97On George Davis’ pioneering use of journals
to promote his products, see Tom Mahoney, The
merchants of life: an account of the American
pharmaceutical industry, New York, Harper &
Brothers, 1959, pp. 71–2.
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americainsisted that the ‘‘method is a very valuable one for collecting evidence’’.
98 The resulting
bulletins provided basic descriptions of the drug, followed by physicians’ ‘‘reports’’:
I have given the pound of Bladderwrack you sent some time ago, to a very corpulent lady who was
suffering from a suppression of the menses. After she had taken the medicine for two or three days,
her menses started up again, and her health commenced improving, while at the same time her flesh
began to diminish until, at the present, the diminution is perceptive to the most casual observer.
99
A handful of reports came from physicians in hospital practice and pharmacologists whose
work the company acknowledged as ‘‘more scientific’’, but most resembled the testimo-
nials common to the era’s ‘‘ethical’’ drug industry.
100 With few exceptions, the studies
were neither collective nor investigations, but endorsements gathered to promote the
company’s products.
101
Physician-organizedsurveyscontinuedintotheearlytwentiethcentury.In1909,George
Richards surveyed ‘‘prominent laryngologists in this country and Europe’’ about their
beliefs and practices regarding tonsillitis.
102 In 1910, a joint committee of the New York
Neurological Society and the New York Academy of Medicine published a monograph on
their ‘‘collective investigation’’ofthe1907poliomyelitisepidemic. Ratherthan publish‘‘a
mere array of statistics’’, the organizers presented analyses from a select group of obser-
vers. Selective in its presentation of clinical and pathological data, the study resembles a
traditional scientific report in tone and format. Its brief discussions of therapy and reha-
bilitation are circumspect and uncontroversial.
103 It is difficult to say when the last col-
lective investigation in the United States took place. By the First World War, the term
seems to have gone out of favour, but it had by then lost any special meaning it might have
had in the movement’s first decade.
Collective investigations in the UnitedStates lacked the ideological inspiration manifest
in the British example. Although local medical societies, composed largely of general
practitioners, sought out the experiences of ordinary physicians, no one objected when
specialty societies surveyed a more selective group. Medical knowledge, like medical
society, was heterogeneous. The meagre results from local collective investigations
revealed to medical e ´lites just how unevenly developed that society was. Most general
practitioners held onto their clinical experience as valuable private property. Even
collective ventures successful at generating data, such as the APS’s inquiries, trod on
98‘Parke, Davis & Co’s collective investigation of
drugs by the Working Bulletin system’, in Working
Bulletin for the Scientific Investigation of Manaca,
Detroit, Scientific Department Parke, Davis & Co,
1884, p. iii.
99‘Bladder-wrack:clinicalreportsfromprivateand
hospital practice’, in The pharmacology of the newer
materiamedica,Detroit, GeorgeS Davis, 1892,p.107.
100See [Issac Ott], ‘The physiological action of
Urechites suberecta’, in The pharmacology of the
newer materia medica, op. cit., note 99 above,
pp. 1195–98.
101The company also supplied drugs to individuals
or organizations conducting collective investigations.
See John Aulde, ‘Arsenite of copper—the results of
collective investigation’, Trans. med. Soc. State Penn.,
1890, 21: 200–2.
102George L Richards, ‘The present status of the
tonsil operation: a collective investigation’, Ann. Otol.
Rhinol. Laryngol., 1909, 18: 739–85.
103Of the 4,000 physicians surveyed, 470 of the
1,100 doctors answering replied that they had seen
poliomyelitis cases. Their 752 case reports were
then reviewed by the committee, which selectively
reported on their findings. Epidemic poliomyelitis.
Report on the New York epidemic of 1907 by the
Collective Investigation Committee, New York,
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
Publishing Company, 1910, pp. 4–9, 29–54,
quote on p. 9.
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Harry M Marksunsure ground when they based clinical recommendations on the findings. The medical
collective remained resolutely laissez-faire, better able to accommodate drug company
testimonials than organized efforts to guide clinical practice.
104
Collective Investigation: Medical Community in the Long and Short Run
The story of collective investigation belongs to the long-run history of professional
collective action, which extends from organized epidemiological inquiries in the eight-
eenth century to the late-twentieth-century movement for evidence-based medicine. Such
efforts depend on substantial contributions of voluntary labour, much of it from hard-
pressed working practitioners. As with all voluntary organizations, individuals must be
strongly motivated to undertake activities with little or no immediate material reward.
105
On this theoretical account, collective action is difficult at best. What are the conditions
that favour success?
Historians have given the most attention to organized epidemiological investigations.
Theseinquiriessucceededwhendatacollection wasanintrinsicpartofthejob,asitwasfor
the reporting physicians in the US Army, whose medical officers demanded such
reports;
106 or when salaried medical officers of health used vital statistics to persuade
local rate-payers in England to invest in sanitary improvements.
107 Getting private practi-
tioners to contribute even to a relatively simple task like disease reporting was a struggle.
English public health authorities experimented with fining non-compliant physicians
before deciding to pay for each report.
108
We lack similarly fine-grained historical accounts of efforts to extend the epidemiolo-
gical model to clinical questions of disease treatment and aetiology. Local medical socie-
ties in Britain and the United States repeatedly attempted such organized inquiries in the
nineteenth century, although few were as long-lived as the movement for collective
investigation.
109 Both collective investigation and its predecessors shared a common
difficulty—that of mobilizing practitioners to devote time and attention to clinical obser-
vation. Well into the twentieth century, organized therapeutic evaluations faced analogous
104On the subsequent history of such efforts, see
Harry M Marks, The progress of experiment: science
and therapeutic reform in the United States,
1900–1990, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
105Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action:
publicgoodsandthetheoryofgroups,Cambridge,MA,
Harvard University Press, 1965.
106On the US Army studies, see Cassedy, op. cit.,
note 65 above, pp. 44–8; see also Peter Mathias’
discussionoforganizedinquiryintheBritishmilitaryin
‘Swords and ploughshares: the armed forces, medicine
and public health in the late eighteenth century’, in
idem, The transformation of England: essays in the
economic and social history of England in the
eighteenth century, London, Methuen, 1979, pp.
265–85.
107John M Eyler, Victorian social medicine: the
ideas and methods of William Farr, Baltimore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 123–49; Simon
Szreter, ‘The GRO and the public health movement
in Britain, 1837–1914’, Soc. Hist. Med., 1991, 4:
435–63; Graham Mooney, ‘Professionalization in
publichealthandthe measurement ofsanitaryprogress
in nineteenth-century England and Wales’, Soc. Hist.
Med., 1997, 10: 53–8.
108Graham Mooney, ‘Public health versus
private practice: the contested development of
compulsory infectious disease notification in
late-nineteenth-century Britain’, Bull. Hist. Med.,
1999, 73: 238–67. As Mooney notes, opposition to
disease reporting was based on more than just the
lack of financial incentives. See also Daniel M Fox,
‘Social policy and city politics: tuberculosis
reporting in New York, 1889–1900’, Bull. Hist. Med.,
1975, 49: 169–95.
109See the sources cited in note 5 above.
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americaproblems in overcoming a medical culture of individualism. Research physicians lacked
both the time and inclination to complete cooperative studies according to agreed-upon
protocols.
110
As important as the recurrent failures of collective action are the seemingly unceasing
attempts at collaborative investigations of disease and treatment. Sociologically, these
efforts flourished more readily in metropolitan areas where professional networks were
dense, and the opportunities for scientific exchange were greatest. The inquiry on myx-
oedema, organized by the Clinical Society of London in the 1880s, built on the Society’s
existing network of consultant physicians.
111 More significant in the long run were the
various communities which transcended geographically fixed medical societies. National
specialty groups are the most obvious example: the American Pediatric Society was far
more successful in obtaining data for its collective investigations than any of the state
medical societies. No less important were the ‘‘intentional communities’’ formed around a
particularvisionofmedicalknowledge:theAmericanalumnioftheParishospitals,studied
by John Warner, or the community of ‘‘therapeutic reformers’’ in the twentieth-century
United States, organized around a shared programme of therapeutic truth.
112
Organized collective investigation in Britain was one such intentional community, built
around the idea that only general practitioners could track the complete natural history of a
disease, and thereby ‘‘catch mischief at its very dawn’’ and pursue ‘‘the various evils to
whichitmayultimatelylead’’.
113Generalpractitionersdidnotconceivethisproject,which
arose in the heart of the London consultant milieu among individuals who taught and
practised morbid anatomy. Their programme for collective investigation was both scien-
tificandsocial.Observationsinthedissectingroomandthehospitalwardcouldnotexplain
why it was that in some children ‘‘every scratch ‘festers’’’ and ‘‘every strained joint
inflames’’ while in others such accidents leave no mark.
114 By enlisting general practi-
tioners to observe in situ—at the bedside and in the home—Humphry and his associates
hoped to elucidate the mysteries of variation in susceptibility to disease. At the same time,
they hoped to refashion general practitioners in their own image as methodical and patient
observers of disease.
In the event, collective investigation failed to bridge the profound gaps between the
world of the hungry, scrabbling practitioner and that of the inquiring, flourishing con-
sultant. To understand fully the story of collective investigation in Britain, we would have
to know far more than we do at present about the material, moral and intellectual worlds of
both consultant and general practitioner communities.
115 Such a historical anthropology of
110Harry M Marks, ‘Notes from the underground:
the social organization of therapeutic research,
1920–1950’, in Russell C Maulitz and Diana Long
(eds), Grand rounds: one hundred years of internal
medicine, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1988, pp. 297–336; Marks, op. cit., note 104
above, pp. 53–60, 98–128.
111‘Report of a Committee of the Clinical Society
of London ...to investigate the subject of
myxoedema’, Trans. Clin. Soc. London, 1888, 21
(Supplement). For background, see Clark T Sawin,
‘Introduction’, Report on myxoedema, facsimile
edition, Boston, Francis A Countway Library of
Medicine, 1991, pp. 1–14.
112John Harley Warner, Against the spirit of
system: the French impulse in nineteenth-century
American medicine, Princeton University Press, 1999;
Marks, op. cit., note 104 above.
113Prescott Gardener Hewett, ‘Address by the
President’, Trans. Clin. Soc. London, 1873, 6:
xxxv–xliv, p. xxxv.
114Paget, op. cit., note 20 above, p. 376.
115For one example of an anthropology of medical
labour and knowledge, see Stephen M Stowe, ‘Seeing
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Harry M Marksmedical knowledge might tell us whether general practitioners were simply indifferent or
actively hostile towards collective investigation. It might better inform us about the
trajectory of morbid anatomy in an e ´lite medical milieu that was, historians tell us, largely
dominated by the contests for power and authority between laboratory medicine and
clinicians.
The story of collective investigation in the United States is less complex. Collective
investigation had no distinctive intellectual identity there. Topographical and climatolo-
gical studies, which might have loomed large at mid-century, were not pursued.
116 Amer-
ica’s pathologists did not consider collective investigation of any particular value to their
enterprise.
117 Accordingly, the American history of collective investigation is largely a
storyabout thedifficulties ofrealizingmedicalcommunity.Like their Britishcounterparts,
American national and local medical e ´lites saw collective investigation as a way of
involvingordinarypractitionersinthescientificlifeoftheprofession.Butfewpractitioners
heededthe call, even in an urbanizedstatesuch asConnecticut and itsprincipal cities, New
Haven, Hartford and Stamford. Therapeutic knowledge was a form of private property,
jealously guarded. Only where practitioners saw a material advantage from publicity did
they participate, as in Parke, Davis’s Therapeutic Gazette. And only in Connecticut did
local medical societies persist with their inquiries; if collective investigation was meant to
build medical community, it did the job poorly.
Innationalspecialtygroups,where theprofessionalrewardsforsharing knowledgewere
better established, the history of collective investigation developed differently. Among
specialists, the community which collective investigation sought to create already existed.
Specialists acknowledged a common interest in collecting and sharing data, a familiar
exercise for those in the scientific e ´lite. But the limits to community were equally clear.
118
At the American Pediatric Society, adjudicating practice on the basis of data gathered
from‘‘observerswedonotknow’’wentbeyondthoselimits.Acollectiveinvestigationlike
the New York report on poliomyelitis, by contrast, made no such demands on practi-
tioners. Cautiously edited, the report’s authors weighed additions to the store of medical
themselvesatwork:physiciansandthecasenarrativein
themid-nineteenth-centuryAmericanSouth’,Am.Hist.
Rev., 1996, 101: 41–79.
116It is worth noting that John Shaw Billings’ call
for collective investigation of race and climate in
medical geography went unheeded: see Billings,
op.cit.,note63above,pp.305–6.NathanDavis’desire
to pursue on-going meteorological investigations via
collectiveinvestigationwassimilarlydisappointed.See
Davis, op. cit., note 3 above. On the geographical
tradition, see Ronald L Numbers, ‘Medical science
before scientific medicine: reflections on the history of
medical geography’, in Nicolaas A Rupke (ed.),
Medical geography in historical perspective, London,
Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at
UCL, 2000, pp. 217–20.
117Adeeperexplorationwouldbeneededtoexplain
why American pathologists did not take up collective
investigation with the fervour of British morbid
anatomists. Russell Maulitz suggests that by the late
nineteenth century, American pathologists had
assumed the identity of a specialized scientific
disciplinewhosepreoccupationswithclinicalmedicine
werenolongercentraltoitsmission.RussellCMaulitz,
‘‘‘The whole company of pathology’’—pathology as
idea and as work in American medical life’, in
Teizo Ogawa (ed.), History of Pathology.
Proceedings of the 8th International Symposiumon the
Comparative History of Medicine—East and West,
Osaka, Taniguchi Foundation, 1986, pp. 139–61;
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role of pathophysiology’, Physiology in the American
Context, 1850–1940, Bethesda, MD, American
Physiological Society, 1987, pp. 209–36.
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Collective Investigation in Britain and Americaknowledge but required no changes in clinical practice. Normal science of this sort posed
no direct challenges to the social order of medicine.
The movement for collective investigation ended in Britain by 1890, lingering on in the
United States through the first decade of the twentieth century. If the movement is more
than a historical oddity, it is because of what its history can tell us about the fabric of
medical community in these two societies. General historians in recent decades have given
us an idea of the complexity of the cultural and social processes by which a sense of
national identity is achieved.
119 The history of collective investigation suggests that
achieving a sense of shared purposes and mutual obligation within medical society
was no less difficult or complex.
119As examples from an enormous literature,
see Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: the making of
France and Spain in the Pyrenees, Berkeley,
University of California Press, 1991; David A Bell,
The cult of the nation in France: inventing
nationalism, 1680–1800, Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press, 2001; Gyanendra
Pandey, Remembering partition: violence,
nationalismandhistoryinIndia,CambridgeUniversity
Press, 2001.
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